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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyze the development of interactive TV in the U.S. and Western 
Europe. We argue that despite the nascent character of the market there are important 
regulatory issues at stake, as exemplified by the AOL/TW merger and the British 
Interactive Broadcasting case. Absent rules that provide for non-discriminatory access to 
network components (including terminal equipment specifications), dominant platform 
operators are likely to leverage ownership of delivery infrastructure into market power 
over interactive TV services. While integration between platform operator, service 
provider and terminal vendor may facilitate the introduction of services in the short-term, 
the lasting result will be a collection of fragmented “walled gardens” offering limited 
content and applications. Would interactive TV develop under such model, the exciting 
opportunities for broad-based innovation and extended access to multiple information, 
entertainment and educational services opened by the new generation of broadcasting 
technologies will be foregone.
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The broadcasting industry is rapidly entering the era of digitization, distributed 
intelligence, and interactivity. Despite lingering standards issues, digital transmission is 
replacing analog in the three major delivery platforms (terrestrial, cable, and DBS). 
Powerful user terminal built upon PC hardware and software technology are replacing 
dumb analog TV sets. And after several failed attempts in the past, interactive TV 
services are finally poised for large-scale deployment. This transition opens many 
exciting opportunities for new applications and services, ranging from TV-based 
electronic commerce (known as “t-commerce”) to interactive educational programming. 
These will evolve as broadcasters, software vendors, hardware makers, and content 
creators and users experiment with novel ways to enhance and perhaps transform the TV 
experience entirely. 
 
This transition, however, also raises several questions about who will shape the 
architecture of the emerging broadcasting networks, and hence determine business 
models, communication patterns, and the dynamics of technological innovation for the 
next generation of broadcasting. Will programmers or network operators decide which 
interactive services will be made available to users? Will electronic marketplaces develop 
as open transactional spaces or “walled gardens”? Will network users be able to connect 
new terminal equipment to the network and experiment with new network uses (e.g., 
peer-to-peer applications)? In lieu to these questions policymakers are faced with several 
pressing concerns. How to create incentives for firms to invest in this infant marketplace 
and at the same time protect competition in services and applications, foster decentralized 
innovation, and guarantee users’ access to a wide range of information and transaction 
services? Would ex-ante regulation squelch the success of a sector that, after many failed 
attempts, is now ready for prime-time? What regulatory principles and tools should be 
used to confront the questions raised by interactive TV? 
 
Far from hypothetical, these questions have already surfaced in several high-profile 
cases, in particular the AOL/Time Warner merger, which combined the world’s largest 
ISP and early entrant in the interactive TV market with the U.S.’ second largest cable 
operator and major worldwide programmer. In reviewing the merger, the Federal Trade 
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Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) found that the 
combination of distribution facilities, service operations, and content held by AOL/Time 
Warner raised competition concerns in three markets: broadband Internet access service, 
broadband Internet transport service, and interactive TV. While regulators imposed 
several merger conditions concerning broadband Internet access and transport services, 
those relating to interactive TV were, in comparison, rather minor. 
 
In this paper we analyze the development of interactive TV in the U.S. and Western 
Europe and the policy debates that have accompanied it. We argue that despite the 
nascent character of the market there are important regulatory issues at stake that will 
determine the future architecture of this information distribution platform. Absent rules 
that provide for non-discriminatory access to network components and a degree of 
standardization for terminal equipment, dominant platform operators are likely to 
leverage ownership of delivery infrastructure into market power over interactive TV 
services. While in the short-term integration between platform operator, service provider 
and terminal vendor is likely to facilitate the introduction of services, the lasting result 
will be a collection of fragmented “walled gardens” offering limited content and 
applications. Would interactive TV develop under such model, the exciting opportunities 
for broad-based innovation and extended access to multiple information, entertainment 
and educational services may be foregone. 
 
We recognize that given the incipient nature of the market (particularly in the U.S.), it 
would be premature for regulators to attempt to implement detailed industry-wide rules 
for interactive TV platforms and services. There is simply too much uncertainty about 
which services users will want (and at what price), how the technology will evolve, and 
what business models will emerge. It may be that the dynamics of market competition 
will stimulate a migration from proprietary technologies and “walled garden” business 
models to open standards and interconnected networks (much like what happened in the 
narrow-band ISP industry during the 1990’s), thus making regulatory safeguards less 
necessary. We nonetheless content that it is not too early to establish general rules and 
first principles with which to monitor market developments. Interactive TV provides 
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another test case of how to adapt existing broadcasting and telecommunications 
regulation to the ongoing convergence of digital networks in a way that balances industry 
development with the economic and social benefits associated with open network access. 
The debate over broadband cable Internet offered a first approach to the problem and 
some important lessons.1 While technologies may vary from case to case, our ultimate 
policy goals should not. 
 
The case of interactive TV thus offers an opportunity to investigate how desirable policy 
goals, among them competition, broad-based innovation, and widespread access to 
information “from diverse and antagonistic sources”,2 should be implemented in the post-
convergence environment. We start the paper by reviewing the evolution of the 
broadcasting industry through three successive models: the “Fordist” TV model, the 
multichannel TV model, and the emerging interactive TV model. Second, we characterize 
the basic components of interactive TV and explore the concerns raised by the evolution 
of multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) into interactive TV platform 
operators. Our conclusion is that dominant MVPDs are likely to have the ability and the 
incentive to leverage control over the transmission platform into the ITV applications 
environment, engineering market outcomes in favor of affiliated programmers, electronic 
retailers, and ITV service providers. We note that unlike the case of broadband cable 
Internet the concerns go beyond infrastructure access control and include the use of 
proprietary terminal equipment standards.  
 
Third, we review how regulators in the U.S. and the European Union (EU) have so far 
responded to these concerns by contrasting two cases: the AOL/Time Warner merger and 
British Interactive Broadcasting case. We conclude that the wait-and-see approach taken 
by American regulators risks tolerating the deployment of a closed architecture network 
that would inhibit healthy competition in interactive TV services, hamper innovation, and 
create a large group of second-class digital economy citizens with access to a very limited 
array of entertainment, transaction, and educational services. We also note that the 
                                                 
1 See Bar et al. (2000). 
2 Associated Press v. Unites States, 326 U.S. 1, p. 20 (1945). 
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imposition of limited open access requirements in the UK market has hardly hampered 
investments in interactive TV. Finally, we outline a general framework for regulatory 
thinking about open network access that reflects the convergence of communications 
industry sectors and the need to balance seemingly conflicting policy goals. 
 
1. The three generations of broadcasting 
 
The half-century old broadcasting industry has developed through three technological 
generations, each characterized by different types of services, business models, control 
strategies, and regulatory environment (Table 1). It is interesting to note that each new 
generation has not thoroughly overhauled the pre-existing industry structure, but rather 
added a layer of complexity to it. From the start of commercial broadcasting in the post-
war period to about the mid-1970’s, television consisted essentially of one-way terrestrial 
broadcasting of a limited number of channels which aggregated and sold large audiences 
to advertisers, the operators of which were protected by rules that restricted competition 
both within the industry and from new entrants (Horwitz, 1989; Hazlett, 1998). The 
regulatory model was based on the idea that broadcasters (both public and private) are 
trustees of a public resource (the radio spectrum) and thus under obligation to serve the 
public interest as defined by the government. While government protection from 
competition ensured the profitability of most broadcasting operations, fulfillment of 
public interest obligations was, at best, questionable. 
 
During the 1970’s, a series of technological and regulatory developments created the 
conditions for the rapid growth of cable, and later direct-to-home satellite TV (DBS).3 
These new platforms essentially offered more (and today, much more) of the same 
service: one-way delivery of branded packages of TV programming. However, a new 
business model emerged based on the collection of payments directly from subscribers, 
spawning the growth of specialized channels with limited audience base. The regulatory 
model was fashioned as a mix of traditional broadcasting and utility regulation. Cable 
operators were for the most part granted monopoly franchises by local authorities in 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of these developments see Owen (1999). 
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return for payments and limited access obligations (the so-called PEG and leased access 
channels). The federal government later imposed restrictions on cable operators’ editorial 
control by limiting the number of channels that can be occupied by affiliated video 
programmers.4 Notwithstanding these restrictions, cable essentially developed as a closed 
network with tight integration between network layers (transmission infrastructure, 
service provision, and terminal equipment).  
 
The regulatory model for the second generation of broadcasting thus evolved in 
remarkable contrast with that of the telecommunications network, particularly after the 
FCC reversed its defense of “network integrity” in the late 1960’s, encouraging open 
attachment of terminal devices,5 network interconnection,6 and third-party access to 
unbundled network elements.7 It is thus no surprise that while the telecommunications 
industry has experienced a period of unprecedented innovation based on experimentation 
by network users and third-party service providers over the last three decades, the pace of 
innovation and introduction of new services in the cable industry has, in comparison, 
been limited by the creativity and the narrow economic incentives of those in quasi-
monopoly control of the transmission infrastructure. 
 
After much delay, the revolution in digital processing and transmission of information is 
finally ushering the broadcasting industry into a new era. As a long-time industry analyst 
described it, “after a half-century of glacial creep, television technology begun to change 
at the same dizzying pace as the wares of Silicon Valley.”8 But as MVPDs evolve from 
distributors of video programming into operators of a network that supports a variety of 
information services, regulators are confronted with a fundamental policy question: under 
what regulatory model should the next generation of television services develop? That of 
the second generation of broadcasting - even though cable and satellite operators may 
effectively act as providers of telecommunications infrastructure rather than as content 
                                                 
4 See 47 U.S.C. § 613(f). 
5 See In the Matter of Use Of The Carterfone Device In Message Toll Telephone Service, Docket No. 
16942; 13 FCC 2d 420 (1968). 
6 See Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 FCC 2d 870 (1971). 
7 See In the Matter of Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Services 
and Facilities, 60 FCC 2d 261 (1976). 
8 Owen (1999), p.3. 
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aggregators and distributors - or that of open network access that has guided much 
telecommunications policy over the last decades? 
 
Table 1: The three generation of broadcasting 
 1
st Generation: 
Fordist TV 
2nd Generation: 
Multichannel TV 
3rd Generation: 
Interactive TV 
Service One-way broadcasting of few video channels 
One-way broadcasting 
of multiple video 
channels 
Two-way delivery of 
multiple video channels 
and other services 
Business model Mass advertising and/or license fees 
Mass advertising, 
license fees, and 
subscriptions 
Targeted advertising,  
subscriptions, and  
transaction fees 
Control 
strategies 
Property rights over 
spectrum license 
Integration of 
distribution and content 
assets 
Access control and 
proprietary standards 
Regulatory 
model 
Public trustee 
(incumbent protection) 
Mix of public trustee 
and limited utility 
regulation 
(to be defined) 
 
 
2. What is interactive TV? 
 
Due to the infancy of the market, any description of what constitutes interactive TV is 
necessarily a working definition. In the context of this paper, we adopt a definition 
broader in scope than the one recently proposed by the FCC. In a public consultation, the 
Commission has defined interactive TV as “a service that supports subscriber-initiated 
choices or actions that are related to one or more video programming streams.”9 Instead, 
we agree with the British broadcasting regulator (the Independent Television 
Commission, henceforth ITC) in that interactive TV services are “pull” services initiated 
by the subscriber to a MVPD that are not necessarily related to any specific video 
programming.10 In fact, we differentiate between two essentially different types of 
interactive TV services: dedicated and program-related services. 
 
                                                 
9 FCC (2001). In the Matter of Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of Interactive Television Service over 
Cable. CS Docket No. 01-7, p. 2. 
10 See Independent Television Commission (2000). Interactive Television: An ITC Public Consultation. 
Available at www.itc.org.uk. 
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The first are stand-alone services not related to any specific programming stream. 
Typically, this will be entertainment, information, and transaction services provided by 
electronic retailers on the basis of contracts with the MVPD, which acts essentially as 
platform operator, offering subscribers a “window” for t-commerce. Examples of these 
services already available or in the deployment stage are Electronic Programming Guides 
or EPGs (in a sense the more mature of interactive TV services, discussed in more detail 
below), video-on-demand (already launched in several cable markets by interactive TV 
provider DIVA), e-mail (offered for example by Microsoft’s WebTV), games, gambling, 
and electronic banking (available for example through the BiB platform). While some of 
these electronic retailers may already have Internet-based services, these typically need to 
be re-authored for the different systems used by network operators (though as discussed 
below there are several standardization efforts under way). In comparison, these 
platforms are strictly “walled gardens” environments: the network operator selects a 
limited number of electronic merchants that is made available to users, and typically 
charges an upfront fee for access control (e.g., authentication) and billing services as well 
as a commission on sales.11 
 
Program-related services refer to interactive TV services that are directly related to one or 
more video programming streams. These services allow users to obtain additional data 
related to the content (either programming or advertising), to select from a menu of video 
feeds, to play or bet along with a show or sports event, to interact with other viewers of 
the same program, or to initiate transactions of goods or services featured in the video 
programming. In this case, interactive TV enhancements (such as ATVEF “triggers”)12 
are overlayed onto the MPEG video programming stream. These enhancements, when 
selected, direct viewers to content stored either in the set-top box or a remote server. In 
the latter case, the enhanced content is delivered either through the same video pipeline 
or a separate transmission line (e.g., an Internet connection). Examples of services 
already available or in the deployment stage are the delivery of on-demand financial 
                                                 
11 For example, BiB reportedly takes a 8% commission on sales. See “At least television works,” The 
Economist, October 7, 2000. 
12 ATVEF (Advanced Television Enhancement Forum) is a cross-industry group formed by programmers, 
broadcasters, interactive TV service providers, hardware makers, and software developers intended to 
create standard protocols for the delivery of interactive TV enhancements. See www.atvef.com. 
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information and stock quotes along with a business new channel (e.g., CNBC in 
partnership with Wink Communications), enhanced TV commercials that allow viewers 
to request more information about the product, enhanced educational programming (a 
partnership between PBS and RespondTV), and services that allow users to play or bet 
along quiz shows, reality shows, and live sports events. 
 
In the case of program-related services the programmer or advertiser will typically 
contract with an interactive TV service provider for the creation of programming 
enhancements, storage of interactive content, and management of return channel data. 
Nevertheless, the compliance of the network operator is still needed to deliver the 
downstream program enhancements, to allow compatibility between interactive TV 
applications and operator-provided customer equipment (unless a stand-alone box is 
used, which is unlikely for reasons discussed below), and possibly to provide the high-
speed return path needed for certain applications. Therefore, the ability of programmers 
and interactive TV service providers to experiment with and deploy services is de facto 
dependent on access to both the transmission infrastructure and the home terminal 
functions. As we argue in the next section, unless regulatory safeguards guarantee such 
access on non-discriminatory terms, the next generation of broadcasting services will 
(like the previous generations) be characterized by slow innovation and limited 
competition. 
 
While the market for interactive TV is still maturing, the pace of development has 
accelerated dramatically in recent years. Growth has been fueled by decreasing 
equipment costs (of both network hardware and home terminals)13 and related 
infrastructure investments that facilitate the provision of interactive TV services, in 
particular the slow but steady migration to digital transmission standards in terrestrial, 
cable, and satellite TV.14 Analysts estimate that in Britain 25% of households will use 
                                                 
13 For example, the cost of video servers, the core component of video-on-demand systems, has dropped 
90% over the last years (see “Interactive Television: Fulfilling the Promise,” Broadcasting & Cable, July 
10, 2000, p.22). The cost of digital set-top boxes has also dropped dramatically in recent years following 
the decline in prices for computer components. 
14 For a discussion of the transition to digital TV see Galperin (forthcoming). 
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some interactive TV service this year, with the U.S. lagging behind with 7.5%.15 
Furthermore, it is expected that TV-based Internet access will eventually outpace PC-
based access, particularly in regions with low PC penetration such as Europe.16 Such 
rapid growth should not preclude regulatory action as some have argued (e.g., Elhauge, 
2001). Quite the contrary, it represents an opportunity for policymakers to shape the next 
generation of broadcasting services in a way that fosters innovation and competition 
during the formative period of the industry, much like policy intervention favoring open 
network access in telecommunications networks starting in the late 1960’s made possible 
the Internet revolution several years later.17 
 
3. Policy concerns raised by interactive TV 
 
Different opportunities for dominant network operators to foreclose competition in the 
adjacent markets for interactive TV and video programming services exist at different 
network layers. In this section we examine the opportunities and incentives for anti-
competitive behavior that result from vertical integration between network operators and 
interactive TV service provider at three network layers: the transmission system, the 
return path, and the home terminal (typically a digital set-top box). We argue that 
switching costs, network complementarities, first-mover advantages and technical 
advantages are likely to create a dominant platform for the delivery of ITV services in 
every geographic market (in most cases the monopoly cable franchisee) for which there 
will be no close substitutes. As a result, unaffiliated interactive TV service providers and 
programmers may face discriminatory access to the transmission infrastructure necessary 
to compete in the third generation of broadcasting. This risk will likely dampen 
innovation and discourage entry by third-party application developers and programmers 
into the interactive TV market. 
 
                                                 
15 Source: Jupiter Media Matrix. 
16 The British government has already stated its goal that following the digital switchover every home with 
a TV-set and a telephone line has access to the Internet. See Joint ITC, OFTEL, and OFT Advice to 
Government on Digital Television, November 2000, available at www.oftel.gov.uk. 
17 See Bar et al. (2000). 
 12 
a) Transmission system 
 
In the case of program-related services, the most apparent opportunity that exists for 
network operators to discriminate in favor of affiliated interactive TV service providers 
and programmers consists in “stripping” the interactive TV enhancements from the video 
signal of an unaffiliated programmer, thus blocking access to the enhanced features 
offered by the competing programmer. Time Warner Cable, for example, has repeatedly 
blocked subscriber access to Guide Plus+, a free EPG offered by interactive TV provider 
Gemstar that is carried over the VBI.18 By stripping out the data inserted by Gemstar in 
the VBI of local television broadcast stations, Time Warner was favoring a competing 
EPG offered by its cable subsidiaries.19  
 
It is important to note that in the case of program-related services, the issue is not of 
programmers’ access rights to cable distribution per se. Even when the network operator 
has agreed (or is forced by statute, as in the case of local TV stations) to carry an 
unaffiliated programmer, it has the ability to favor its own related programmer (e.g., 
AOL/TW’s Cartoon Network vs. Disney’s Disney Channel) by stripping out the 
interactive features of a rival’s video signal (e.g., the ATVEF triggers). Alternatively, the 
platform operator can slow down the rate of transmission of the downstream interactive 
data, thus interfering with the synchronization between the interactive service and the 
programming to which it is related. The ultimate effect is similar: to make an unaffiliated 
video signal less compelling as an information/entertainment experience. 
 
In the case of dedicated interactive TV services, the bundling of transmission and 
interactive TV services presents question similar to those discussed in the context of the 
debate over broadband cable Internet. Nonetheless, the concerns are exacerbated by the 
fact that, unlike ISPs, interactive TV service providers face from the start the closed 
network architecture of the second generation of broadcasting, rather than the open, end-
                                                 
18 The Vertical Blanking Interval (VBI) is the interval between television frames in analog broadcasting, 
which allows for a limited data transmission capacity (typically used for closed-captioning services). 
19 See In Re Petition for Special Relief of Gemstar, CSR-5528-Z. Due to regulatory scrutiny of the 
AOL/Time Warner merger, Time Warner Cable has reportedly ceased such practice. 
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to-end architecture of the first-generation Internet. If a single transmission platform 
emerges as the only viable alternatively to compete in the provision of interactive TV 
services (an assumption we explore below), the platform operator does not need to 
reengineer the network in order to favor its affiliates because entry will be, from the 
outset, by invitation only. As the ITC explains, 
 
“The distinctiveness of interactive television services as compared with 
the Internet is manifested in the “walled garden” concept, where a limited 
number of sites or parts of sites are selected by the interactive licensee 
(…). In this environment an interactive licensee has the potential to 
exercise a degree of pre-selection and control of content through their 
contractual relationships with the providers of the walled garden content. 
This factor (…) suggest that a somewhat different treatment is needed than 
applied to the Internet” (ITC, 2000, p. 7). 
 
Critics of ex-ante regulatory action on interactive TV nonetheless contend that network 
operators are unlikely to have incentives to discriminate against unaffiliated interactive 
TV providers or programmers, and thus any rules imposed will have costly effects on 
investments and service efficiency. As Elhauge argues, 
 
“it is implausible that any local ITV platform could hope to raise entry 
barriers by denying access to rival ITV service providers. Because it could 
not raise entry barriers, it would have incentives to deny access if and only 
if such a denial were efficient: either because the denied provider would 
not efficiently fit the platform or because vertical integration of ITV 
platforms and services is more efficient. Any interference with such 
decisions would make ITV markets inefficient, with higher costs or lower 
quality for consumers” (Elhauge, 2001, p. 35). 
 
In our opinion, the argument that vertically-integrated network operators will lack 
incentives to discriminate, and hence will offer access to as many programmers and 
service providers as would “fit the platform,” is unconvincing. While it is clear that a 
network operator will want to maximize available content in order to attract subscribers, 
it is not clear that it will have incentives to grant users access to competing interactive TV 
service providers, particularly given the existence of close substitutes in the content 
market. If the revenue gains from additional nationwide sales from affiliated 
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programmers and interactive TV service providers (in the form of carriage fees, 
advertising, commissions on t-commerce, etc.) exceeds the foregone revenue from lost 
subscribers within the cable’s franchises (i.e., those who demanded the content or 
services not available), discrimination maximizes profits for the vertically-integrated 
operator.20 Discrimination may also help preserve cable’s advantage over competing 
MVPDs in the long-term as long as it discourages entry by third parties in the upstream 
market, thus making alternative MVPDs more dependent on programming and interactive 
TV services supplied by cable’s affiliates. 
 
The argument that vertically-integrated network operators will lack incentives to 
discriminate is based on a static notion of market efficiency and consumer welfare that 
overlooks two fundamental goals in communication policymaking: that of fostering 
dynamic innovation in broadcasting services and that of promoting widespread access to 
information “from diverse and antagonistic sources.” The very existence of a gatekeeper 
between interactive TV services and end-users will suffice to discourage entry by 
application developers and programmers.21 The ultimate result would be an efficient (in 
static terms) but highly constrained environment for the conduct of commerce and 
speech. In addition, the argument simply contradicts the actual evidence of 
discriminatory behavior by cable operators against unaffiliated interactive TV service 
providers. As discussed below, the AOL/TW merger case offered ample evidence of the 
use of control over the cable transmission infrastructure to squelch competition in the 
market for next-generation broadcasting services. 
 
b) Return path 
 
Interactive TV is based on the presence of a return path that provides upstream 
communication between the home terminal and the service provider. This return path can 
potentially take many forms: it may be a standard dial-up Internet connection (used for 
                                                 
20 See Declaration of Gregory Sidak and Hal Singer In the Matter of Nondiscrimination in the Distribution 
of Interactive Television Services over Cable. CS Docket No. 01-7. The authors demonstrate that this is the 
case when discrimination discourages unaffiliated programmers or content providers from entering the 
market or induces exit by existing ones. 
21 See Lemley and Lessig (2000). 
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example by WebTV), a proprietary version of a dial-up connection (used by AOLTV), an 
“out-of-band” reverse data channel (as used by most cable operators), or even a wireless 
two-way radio connection (used by Gemstar’s GuidePlus+). For most dedicated 
interactive TV services, the speed and synchronization of the return path with the video 
signal do not pose significant market entry barriers. However, for program-related 
services and dedicated services that do not tolerate latency or require full screen video 
streaming, the availability of a high-speed, high capacity return path that works in close 
coordination with the related video feed is be essential to create a compelling interactive 
TV experience. In most cases this is likely to be a broadband Internet connection. 
 
As a result, cable is likely to become the dominant platform for interactive TV services, 
at least in the U.S. where the cable plant is already installed and rapidly being upgraded 
to provide two-way digital services (we discuss below the European case where DBS 
seems to have a first-mover advantage over cable). As the FTC explains, “cable has 
distinct advantages over alternative ITV transport methods. The television signal is 
already transmitted over cable, which makes synchronizing viewer interaction with the 
programming easier. Neither satellite nor DSL connections can integrate the cable video 
programming and the interactive functionality as smoothly as cable.”22 Cable networks 
also provide extensive transmission capacity in both directions (downstream and 
upstream), a critical factor for the new generation of broadcasting services. Furthermore, 
operators have already made substantial investments in upgrading facilities to offer 
digital TV packages and broadband cable Internet, upon which interactive TV services 
could be piggy-backed.23 As the FCC concludes, “our understanding of the current state 
of technology suggests that the cable platform is likely to be the best suited for delivering 
ITV services, particularly high speed services, for at least the near term.”24 
 
                                                 
22 Federal Trade Commission (2000). Complaint In the matter of America Online Inc. and Time Warner 
Inc.. Docket No. C-3989, p. 4. 
23 The NCTA (National Cable & Telecommunications Association) estimates that by the end of 2001 60% 
of households will be passed by two-way cable plants. 
24 Federal Communication Commission (2001). In the Matter of Nondiscrimination in the Distribution of 
Interactive Television Service over Cable. CS Docket No. 01-7, p. 8. 
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The lack of a credible competitor to discipline cable operators opens several avenues for 
discriminatory behavior in favor of affiliated programmers and interactive TV service 
providers. Cable operators can simply refuse to provide a return path to third parties. In 
fact, during the AOL/TW merger review the FCC received several complaints about 
Time-Warner Cable’s refusal to provide guarantees about non-discriminatory use of the 
return path from unaffiliated programmers.25 The network operator may also degrade the 
quality of the return path (in terms of speed or reliability) offered to third parties. In 
addition, it could seek charges for t-commerce transactions originated through its 
platform. This would be similar to an ISP seeking compensation from electronic retailers 
such as Amazon.com for every item sold to its subscribers. Rather than simply enabling 
transactions under the end-to-end principle, the transport operator would erect a tollgate 
between buyers and sellers.26 Lastly, valuable customer data can be obtained from the 
return path even when the platform operator is not a party of the commercial transaction 
taking place. This has raised concerns not only from third-party programmers and 
interactive TV service providers but also from consumer groups concerned about viewers 
having little control over how the return-path data will be compiled and used.27 
 
c) Home terminal 
 
The third necessary component of an interactive TV system is the home terminal or 
digital set-top box. As the number and complexity of interactive TV services increases, 
so will the processing and storage capacity of the home terminal in order to perform the 
different tasks. In essence, a digital set-top box is similar to a stripped-down PC. There 
are at least two software components within the digital set-top box that, absent regulatory 
safeguards or open industry standards, present opportunities for discriminatory behavior 
by dominant platform operators. The first is the Application Program Interface (API), 
which is the software layer between the operating system (e.g., Microsoft’s Microsoft TV 
                                                 
25 See Ex Parte submission of The Walt Disney Company to the FCC filed October 25, 2000, in CS Docket 
No. 00-30. 
26 As a Time Warner Cable executive explained, “if a programmer wants to offer its advertisers the ability 
to have two-way communications with viewers, the cable operator has to be part of that.” See “AOL-Time 
Warner rivals preparing for interactive TV fight.” The New York Times, September 11, 2000, p. C1. 
27 See TV watches you: The prying eyes of interactive TV. Center for Digital Democracy, June, 2001. 
Available at www.democraticmedia.org. 
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or Liberate’s TV Navigator) and the different applications running on the terminal. In 
order to be available to users, interactive TV applications need to interact with the set-top 
API, in the same way a word processor interacts with the PC’s operating system. 
 
Unlike the more mature PC industry, there is no de facto industry standard for set-top box 
APIs. If such a standard were to develop in the future, and if its technical specifications 
were available to application developers on non-discriminatory terms, the competitive 
concerns associated with the API would be mitigated. There are a number of industry 
consortia working to create an open platform for interactive TV. Among them are 
OpenCable’s OpenCable Applications Platform (OCAP), the DVB’s Multimedia Home 
Platform (MHP), and even a Linux-based platform sponsored by the TV Linux 
Alliance.28 For the foreseeable future, however, proprietary (i.e., non-interoperable) APIs 
will be the deployed by network operators, forcing developers to rewrite interactive TV 
applications for several different environments. 
 
In order to enter the market an interactive TV service provider (assuming it has secured 
both downstream and upstream carriage) faces two options: it can either contract with the 
dominant platform operator to gain access to the installed base of terminals, or it can 
deploy a stand-alone box, thus bypassing the proprietary terminal components altogether. 
The latter option, while theoretically possible, is nonetheless uneconomical for most 
potential entrants. It is highly unlikely that users will be willing to buy a new box for 
every new interactive TV application (who would be willing to buy a separate PC for 
every new application?). The failure of stand-alone boxes marketed by companies like 
ReplayTV (which allowed digital video recording) and WebTV (despite heavy marketing 
spending by its parent Microsoft) has shown that consumers prefer a single box that 
integrates traditional video programming with new services.29 Second, the evidence from 
the introduction of DBS, wireless telephony, and digital TV shows that heavy terminal 
                                                 
28 OpenCable is an initiative of CableLabs, a Research and Development consortium formed by U.S. cable 
operators. The DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting) group is an European consortium formed by equipment 
manufacturers, broadcasters, content producers, software developers, and representatives of national 
regulatory bodies. The TV Linux Alliance is a U.S.-based consortium of technology suppliers to cable, 
satellite and telecommunications network operators. 
29 In fact, Personal Video Recorders (PVRs) by ReplayTV and Tivo are now being embedded into cable 
and satellite receivers. See “ReplayTV goes further upscale”, Red Herring, September 5, 2001. 
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subsidies are necessary. Thus, as an European competition official explains, “the scale of 
investment required means that the new entrants’ most realistic option is to provide a 
service using the set-top boxes which already exist.”30 
 
Access to the API specifications and related facilities (authoring tools, authorization 
keys, memory control, etc.) is therefore critical for potential entrants in the interactive TV 
services market. This creates several opportunities for strategic behavior by dominant 
network operators such as refusing to provide authoring tools, discriminatory access 
pricing, discriminatory allocation of set-top boxes facilities (e.g., set-top box memory for 
caching), and bundling of API access with other services (e.g., conditional access or 
subscription management). European competition authorities have even framed the issue 
as a problem of access to an essential telecommunications facility, which under European 
law triggers several non-discriminatory obligations for dominant network operators.31 
While this doctrine is yet to be applied in a case regarding interactive TV, the language of 
the new regulatory framework proposed by the European Commission (EC) reveals the 
intent to extend existing access obligations to the set-top box components controlled by 
dominant cable and satellite TV operators.32 
 
The second component that raises policy concerns is the Electronic Programming Guide 
(EPG), a navigation software that allows users to browse and select TV channels and 
services. With the manifold increase in the number of channels and applications made 
possible by the transition to digital TV, the EPG is expected to become to the 
broadcasting industry what Web portals have become to the Internet: powerful tools to 
direct traffic and obtain advertising revenues (Mansell, 1999). From a regulatory 
standpoint, the main concern is that dominant platform operators do not use the EPG to 
leverage their power onto the market for video programming and interactive TV services. 
As European regulators explain, 
 
                                                 
30 McCallum (1999), p. 11. 
31 See Temple Lang (1997). 
32 See Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities. COM(2001) 369 final. 
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“Issues of ensuring listing of third-party services or programming, and the 
quality of such listings, will be of critical importance. Exclusive 
arrangements tying particular EPGs to particular service bundles may 
become a problem requiring regulatory intervention to ensure third-party 
access on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms" (EC, 1997, p. 
24). 
 
U.S. policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about issues of first-screen and 
presentation bias, although regulatory action has so far been limited.33 However, with the 
merger of the two major EPG providers (Gemstar and TV Guide) in 1999, the issue has 
come under scrutiny from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 
While the DOJ approved the merger without conditions, it is now investigating Gemstar-
TV Guide for abuse of its control over critical patents for EPG services.34 In Europe, by 
contrast, regulators have taken a more active role in regulating EPG services, either to 
protect third-party programmers and service providers or to favor publicly-funded 
broadcasters. In the UK, for example, OFTEL has interpreted EPGs as covered by the 
non-discriminatory rules for telecommunications access services,35 while the ITC has 
adopted a “code of conduct” for EPG providers that, among other things, mandates that 
the visual interface grants public service channels “due prominence.”36 As discussed 
below in the BiB case, European competition authorities have also acted against 
exclusivity arrangements between EPG providers and dominant platform operators. 
 
4. The cases: The AOL/TW merger and British Interactive Broadcasting 
 
The debate about the proper tools and scope of regulatory action vis-à-vis interactive TV 
services has already surfaced in a number of cases. In this section we analyze two of the 
most prominent ones: the AOL/Time Warner merger and the British Interactive 
                                                 
33 For example, a few provisions were adopted in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the case of EPG 
services offered by Open Video Systems operators (Section 653(b)), as well as in the Satellite Home 
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (Section 338) for EPGs offered by DBS operators. These provisions 
however do not extend to cable systems. 
34 “A guide to navigate the TV maze gives pause”, New York Times, June 25, 2001, p. C1. 
35 See OFTEL (1998). Digital television and interactive services: Ensuring access on fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory terms. Available at www.oftel.gov.uk. 
36 Independent Television Commission (1997). ITC Code of Conduct on Electronic Programme Guides. 
London: ITC. 
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Broadcasting (BiB) case, a joint venture for the launch of interactive TV services in the 
UK created by BSkyB, British Telecommunications (BT), Midland Bank (part of the 
HSBC banking group), and Matsushita, the Japanese consumer electronics giant. We 
contrast the approach taken by U.S. and European regulators to the issues raised by these 
cases and analyze the implications of the regulatory obligations imposed in each case. 
 
a. The AOL/Time Warner merger 
 
The January 2000 announcement of the merger between AOL and Time Warner 
prompted close scrutiny by federal regulators. The FTC concluded that the combination 
of AOL’s Internet properties with Time Warner’s cable holdings and content assets had 
anti-competitive effects in three distinct markets: broadband Internet access service, 
broadband Internet transport service, and interactive TV services.37 While most of the 
policy debate that followed the merger announcement focused on the first two issues, the 
FTC findings also brought attention to the architecture of next-generation broadcasting 
networks. Much of the investigation concerning interactive TV centered on AOLTV, 
AOL’s interactive TV product. The existing generation of AOLTV consists of a stand-
alone set-top box that connects to a cable or DBS receiver and blends this video 
programming with interactive content transmitted via a narrowband dial-up modem. 
While regulators raised few concerns about this service, AOL’s plan to upgrade it by 
embedding AOLTV within cable boxes and utilizing the broadband Internet platform of 
the cable operator did trouble competition authorities. As the FTC explains, 
 
“AOL recently launched AOL TV, a first generation  ITV service, and is 
well positioned to become the leading ITV provider. Local cable 
companies will play the key role in enabling the delivery of ITV services. 
After the merger, AOL Time Warner will have incentives to prevent or 
deter rival ITV providers from competing with AOL’s ITV service. Thus 
the merger could enable AOL to exercise unilateral market power for ITV 
services in Time Warner cable areas, which also affects the ability of ITV 
providers to compete nationally”38 
                                                 
37 Federal Trade Commission (2000). Complaint In the matter of America Online Inc. and Time Warner 
Inc.. Docket No. C-3989. 
38 Federal Trade Commission (2000). Analysis of proposed consent order in the matter of America Online 
Inc. and Time Warner Inc.. Docket No. C-3989, p. 2. 
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Despite the strong wording of these findings, the FTC ultimately imposed rather weak 
remedies concerning interactive TV. The consent decree simply prohibits AOL-Time 
Warner from interfering with its subscribers’ ability to use the interactive signals or 
“triggers” provided by programmers that it has agreed (or is forced by statute) to carry.39 
In essence, the FTC order only addressed one of the possible anti-competitive strategies 
discussed above, that of network operators “stripping” the signals of unaffiliated 
programmers from its interactive content. Other discriminatory practices related to 
downstream transmission, upstream transmission (the return path) and the home terminal 
were left unaddressed. 
 
The FCC concurred with the findings of the FTC merger review vis-à-vis interactive TV: 
 
“AOL Time Warner would have the potential ability to use its combined 
control of cable system facilities, video programming and the AOLTV 
service to discriminate against unaffiliated video programming networks 
in the provision of ITV services in the provision of ITV services. We also 
find that AOL Time Warner may have incentives to engage in such 
discriminatory behavior.”40 
 
The FCC analysis is broader in scope and acknowledges that the anti-competitive 
strategies available to AOL/TW go beyond the “stripping” of interactive content of 
unaffiliated programmers. It also notes that the Memorandum of Understanding by which 
the merger parties committed to provide customers with a choice of ISPs does not 
obligate AOL/Time Warner to provide access to the cable broadband platform for 
interactive TV uses. Nonetheless, the FCC declined to impose additional conditions on 
the parties pending further examination of market developments and the potential 
incentives for discriminatory behavior by AOL/TW. In the Commission’s analysis, the 
FTC’s prohibition on “stripping” coupled with the conditions relating to the availability 
                                                 
39 Federal Trade Commission (2000). Decision and Order In the matter of America Online Inc. and Time 
Warner Inc.. Docket No. C-3989, p. 11. 
40 Federal Communications Commission (2000). In the Matter of Applications for Consent to the Transfer 
of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., 
Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee. Memorandum Opinion and Order. CS Docket No. 00-
30, p. 90. 
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of multiple ISPs suffice to protect competition, at least during the initial stages of the 
interactive TV market. In the words of then Commissioner (and now Chairman) Michael 
Powell, “although it is possible to hypothesize public interest harms flowing from a cable 
operator’s control of assets like those at issue in this merger, the market is too immature 
to conclude with any confidence whether such harms are sufficiently probable to warrant 
direct government intervention.”41 
 
b. The British Interactive Broadcasting case 
 
BiB operates one of the largest and most advanced interactive TV service worldwide. It is 
available to the nearly five million subscribers of BSkyB’s digital TV satellite service, 
offering a variety of dedicated services such as e-mail, electronic banking, games, and 
gambling, as well as program-related services tied to channels offered by BSkyB. The 
company was created in 1997 as a joint venture between BSkyB, British 
Telecommunications (BT), Midland Bank, and Matsushita.42 It provides interactive TV 
services in the UK by means of satellite broadcasting (leased from BSkyB, with BT 
responsible for the uplink) in combination with a narrowband return path through a 
standard telephone line. The terminal equipment needed to use BiB services is embedded 
in the BSkyB digital TV set-top box, which BiB partly subsidizes (this includes a 
proprietary API developed by OpenTV43 and BSkyB’s EPG). Revenues come from end-
users and from retailers and interactive TV service providers which BiB carries on its 
platform.44 
 
European competition authorities raised two main concerns about BiB. First, that the 
company would use its control of the set-top box software components to foreclose 
competition in interactive TV services, denying third parties access to the heavily 
subsidized boxes being deployed. Second, that BiB would enhance the already dominant 
                                                 
41 Press statement of Commissioner Michael Powell on the approval of AOL/Time Warner merger. 
42 In March 2001, BSkyB completed the acquisition of HSBC’s and Matsushita’s shareholdings in BiB. It 
now controls 80.1% of the company, with BT remaining a minority partner. 
43 OpenTV is a developer of interactive TV software originally founded by Sun Microsystems and 
Thomson Multimedia in 1994. 
44 According to BiB, there are currently 35 retail partners on the platform. 
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position of BSkyB and BT in the markets for pay-TV and telecommunications local loop 
respectively. In October 1998, the EC approved the joint venture subject to a number of 
conditions. In contrast to the AOL/TW case, the regulatory concerns were centered not 
on the transmission or the return path layers, but on ensuring that “third parties, whether 
operators of digital television or digital interactive TV services, have fair, reasonable, and 
non-discriminatory access to all proprietary components of the digital set-top box which 
BiB will subsidise.”45 This different focus is due to the fact that while cable operators 
effectively control the transmission infrastructure, satellite TV operators lease capacity 
from (oftentimes unaffiliated) satellite carriers.46 Market power therefore stems not from 
control over transmission infrastructure but rather from first-mover advantages and 
switching costs associated with proprietary home terminals.47 
 
One of the conditions imposed concerned the recovery of the home terminal subsidy. The 
Commission forced BiB to establish a separate company to manage the subsidy payments 
in order to ensure that the recovery is evenly distributed among service operators and 
broadcasters, whether affiliated with BiB and its partners or not. It also demanded that the 
subsidy was not linked to a subscription to BSkyB’s pay-TV service. Another condition 
related to the terms of access to the home terminal components. BiB agreed to provide, 
upon request, the API specifications and other proprietary technical systems to third 
parties. The Commission also forced BiB to end its exclusivity agreement with BSkyB 
whereby BiB would be the only available interactive TV service on BSkyB’s EPG. In 
addition, the Commission also imposed several obligations on the joint venture partners. 
BSkyB agreed to offer access services to programmers and interactive TV service 
providers (including BiB) on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms regulated by 
OFTEL under the access control class license.48 It also agreed to supply, upon request, a 
“clean feed” (i.e., stripped of interactive applications) of its film and sports channels to 
                                                 
45 McCallum (1999), p. 13. 
46 In the case of BSkyB, it leases satellite capacity from SES (Société Européenne des Satellites). 
47 For a discussion of these advantages see Cave (1997). 
48 Class licence for the running of telecommunication systems for the provision of access control services 
granted by the secretary of state under section 7 of the telecommunications act 1984. Available at 
www.dti.gov.uk. 
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other MPVPDs (e.g., cable operators) in order to prevent bundling strategies that would 
favor BiB. Finally, BT agreed to divest its existing cable interests.49 
 
The conditions imposed by the EC on the BiB venture are consistent with the established 
doctrine among Community competition authorities that ex-post competition rules are 
insufficient to remedy the problem of access to telecommunications facilities, and thus 
need to be supplemented by ex-ante, sector-specific regulations.50 This doctrine has been 
implemented through a series of Community Directives under the so-called Open 
Network Provision (ONP) framework, which imposes on telecommunications operators 
having significant market power certain non-discriminatory obligations that go beyond 
those that would normally apply under general competition law.51 It is interesting to note 
that a few weeks before the BiB decision, the Commission adopted the Access Notice, 
which explicitly states that the ONP framework extends not only to telecommunications 
facilities, but to “access issues in digital communications sectors generally."52 
 
This extension of telecom-type regulations to next-generation broadcasting technologies 
as exemplified in the BiB decision has drawn criticism about regulatory overreach. 
Critics argue that Community competition authorities have taken a narrow, static view of 
what is still a nascent market, thus discouraging investments and rewarding less 
innovative firms (e.g., Veljanovski, 1999; Larouche, 1998). The debate draws attention to 
the fact that the application of competition law necessarily depends on underlying 
assumptions about how the market should work and what goals should be prioritized. In 
our view, the assumption that access to network components by third parties is a 
precondition for long-term innovation is hardly static. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
nature of broadcasting services demands a more narrow, possibly nation-based definition 
than in the case of telecommunications (Temple Lang, 1997). Lastly, market 
                                                 
49 For details on these conditions see Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 322 
of October 21, 1998. 
50 See Ungerer (2000). 
51 The general framework is provided by the ONP Framework Directive (Council Directive 90/387/EEC, 
OJ L192/1). The ONP framework has been applied to several industry segments, among them leased lines 
(92/44/EEC), packet-switched data (EC, 92/382/EEC), and voice telephony (95/62/EC). 
52 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, 
OJ C 265, p.3. 
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developments have simply proved these arguments unfounded. With Britain leading the 
world in the deployment of interactive TV,53 it is clear that the condition imposed have 
hardly discouraged investment in this maturing market. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the aftermath of the AOL/TW merger the debate about open cable access seems to 
have faded. However, the more general problem of nondiscriminatory access to the basic 
layers of communications infrastructure (whether cable lines, the local loop, or the digital 
TV user terminal) is arguably the crucial issue for industry and regulators in the post-
convergence era. In this paper we have examined how this problem has re-emerged with 
the migration to the third generation of broadcasting technology, that of interactive TV. 
We argued that absent regulatory safeguards that provide for non-discriminatory access 
to several network components (including digital set-top box components), dominant 
network operators are likely to leverage ownership of delivery infrastructure into market 
power over interactive TV services, foreclosing competition and discouraging third 
parties and users from experimenting with unimagined ways to use television. 
 
In the case of interactive TV, the question of open access is not about extending existing 
regulatory principles to the new generation of technologies (as it is for the case of 
broadband Internet). Rather, it is about seizing the opportunities offered by these new 
technologies to better serve our policy goals. Broadcasting regulation has traditionally 
taken distribution scarcities and closed network architecture as a fact of life dictated by 
the available technology, thus relying on ownership rules, licensing criteria, must-carry 
rules and other regulatory instruments to attain its goals.54 It is now widely acknowledged 
that this approach has not only largely failed on its own merits but that it is inadequate for 
the post-convergence era.55 The third generation of broadcasting calls for shifting the 
focus of regulatory action from government “tinkering with the configuration of a mass 
                                                 
53 See “Those interactive Britons are tuning on their tellies,” The New York Times, April 18, 2001. 
54 See among many others Pool (1983) and Mulgan (1991). 
55 For a U.S. critique see Hazlett and Spitzer (2000). For a European critique see Hoffmann-Riem (1996). 
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media market”56 to rules that ensure nondiscriminatory access to the capacity to 
experiment with and provide information, entertainment, and transaction services over 
broadcasting networks. 
 
American regulators have so far imposed rather toothless safeguards to prevent 
discriminatory behavior by incumbent network operators in the interactive TV market. 
Furthermore, these rules are dispersed across statutes addressing different platforms, thus 
adversely affecting market competition. European authorities, by contrast, are in the 
process of fashioning a comprehensive framework that addresses problems of access and 
interconnection across electronic communications networks.57 This framework does not 
impose specific remedies but rather lays out general principles to tackle problems as they 
arise. By addressing access in a piecemeal, ad-hoc fashion, U.S. policymakers threaten to 
undermine the very basis of the unprecedented innovation in telecommunications and 
information services of the last decade and forego the possibility to overhaul an 
antiquated broadcasting regulatory regime. 
                                                 
56 Benkler (2000), p. 562. 
57 See Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities. COM(2001) 369 final. 
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